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Abstract 
We study the reaction of stock prices to announcements of reductions in force 
(RIFs) using a sample of 4273 such announcements in 1160 large firms during 
the 1970-99 period collected from the Wall Street Journal. We note that the 
total number of actual announcements for the firms in our sample follows the 
business cycle quite closely. We then examine changes over time in standard 
summary statistics (means, medians, fraction positive) of the distribution of stock 
market reactions, measured by the cumulative excess returns (CER) of firms’ 
stock prices over a 3-day event window centered on the announcement date, as 
well as changes over time in kernel density estimates of this distribution. We 
find clear evidence that the distribution of stock market reactions shifted to 
the right (became less negative) over time. One possible explanation for this 
change is that, over the last three decades, RIFs designed to improve efficiency 
have become more common relative to RIFs designed to cope with reductions 
in product demand. We estimate multivariate regression models of the CER 
controlling for the stated reason for the announceed layoff, industry, and other 
characteristics of the announced layoff. We find that almost none of the decline 
in the negative average stock price reaction between the 1970s and 1990s can be 
explained by these factors. JEL Classification: G14,J63. Keywords: Layoffs, Job 
Loss, Event Studies. 
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1 Introduction 
There has been substantial discussion in the business press and elsewhere recently about 
the effects of “downsizing” on firms, workers, and families. While the effects of job loss on 
workers are clearly negative (see, for example, Farber, 2003), there have been suggestions 
in the business press and by policy groups that owners of firms profit handsomely as stock 
prices increase around the time of job loss announcements (Anderson and Cavanagh, 1994, 
and Sloan, 1996). These suggestions persist despite a growing body of empirical work that 
finds fairly consistent negative reactions of stock prices to announcements of reductions in 
the labor force (RIFs). 
A straightforward interpretation of a negative relationship between announcements of 
RIFs and stock prices is that the RIFs signal a reduction in product demand relative to 
existing production capacity. I t is more difficult to understand why stock prices might re-
spond positively to announcements of RIFs. One interpretation that resonates with much of 
the recent attention paid to corporate “downsizing” and “restructuring” is that announce-
ments of RIFs might signal that management has found more efficient ways to produce using 
less (or cheaper) labor.1 To the extent that “efficiency” RIFs have become more common 
relative to “deficient demand” RIFs over the last three decades, we would expect that the 
average relationship between announcements of RIFs and stock prices would have become 
less negative (or even positive) over time. 
In order to address this issue, we use information from the Wall Street Journal to create 
as complete a list as possible of announcements of RIFs by every firm that was ever listed in 
the Fortune 500 for each of the 30 years from 1970 though 1999. We collected data on 4273 
RIFs. This is about three times more than examined in any previous study, and the 30 years 
are roughly four times more than any previous work. These data offer us the opportunity to 
investigate whether and, to some extent, why there has been a changing relationship between 
share prices and announced RIFs over time. 
1
 See, for example, Dial and Murphy (1995) who present an interesting intensive case study of restructuring 
at General Dynamics in the early 1990s. They argue that the restructuring, which included RIFs, resulted 
in efficiency improvements and value creation. 
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We were motivated by at least five different questions in this work. While we do not fully 
devlop a single conceptual framework here, we concentrate on these main areas (and others) 
throughout the work. 
• Has the share price impact of announced employment reductions become less negative 
over time? 
• Has the distribution of reason types changed over time? 
• Do stock prices react differently to RIF announcements of different reasons? 
• How much of the decline in the share price reaction can be attributed to changes in 
reasons for layoffs? 
• Can changes in other characteristics of announcements account for the decline in the 
share price reaction? 
We find evidence that the stock market reaction to announcements of RIFs has, in fact, 
changed. The average share price reaction, as measured by the average cumulative excess 
return (CER) over a three day event window centered on the announcement date, was most 
negative in the early part of the period covered, and the average reaction has become less 
negative in more recent years. We estimate the averge share price reaction over the entire 
1970-1999 period to be -0.315 percent (s.e. = 0.073). Broken down by decade, the average 
reaction was -0.594 (s.e. = 0.113) in the 1970s, -0.240 (s.e. = 0.118) in the 1980s, and 
-0.059 (s.e. = 0.152) in the 1990s. We also find 1) that the distribution of announced rea-
sons changed, moving away from “deficient-demand” and toward “restructuring” and “cost 
issues”, and 2) that the stock price reaction to deficient-demand announcements is more 
negative than the reaction to other announcements. We go on to develop a multivariate 
regression model of the CER in order to consider whether the mix of reasons for the an-
nounced RIFs, the industry makeup and other RIF characteristics have changed over time 
and whether any of these have any explanatory power in describing the trend in the average 
CER. We find that very little, if any, of the decline in the negative average stock price re-
action between the 1970s and 1990s can be accounted for by changing characteristics of the 
announced RIFs. 
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2 Data 
Our data come from three distinct sources. The first is a comprehensive set of information 
collected from the Wall Street Journal of every announcement we could find of a job loss in 
each firm that ever existed in the Fortune 500 over a period of 30 years beginning in 1970. 
We collect accounting data from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT and daily stock return 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. 
We created our job loss announcement sample by identifying each firm that ever existed 
in the Fortune 500 from 1970-1999. This left us with a list of 1849 different firm names over 
the 30 years. For each year, we then searched through the abstracts of each Wall Street 
Journal Index by company name for any announcement of a RIF. When an example was 
found, we recorded the date of the announcement and then went on and read the full article 
in order to gather as much information as possible about each announcement. An unusual 
feature of our data is the long time period. We searched the paper index because, at the time 
the data were collected, no electronic source would allow us to search as far back as 1970 and 
we wanted to use a consistent sample throughout the entire time period. Our tabulations 
of announcements of RIFs compare favorably with Hallock (1998) who has completed the 
largest previous study (using data from 1987-1995) using data from an electronic source. 
There are some potential problems in using data collected from a source such as the 
Wall Street Journal (see Thompson, Olsen, and Dietrich, 1987). For example, it may not be 
the case either that all RIFs are announced in the Wall Street Journal or that the Journal 
chooses to report all events. But we believe that most events are reported in the Wall Street 
Journal. This is because the original sample consists of firms that are among the largest in 
the United States, so it makes sense that the Wall Street Journal would report news of even 
quite small events involving these firms. Evidence for this is that there are many instances 
of very small events reported. In addition, we are primarily interested in investigating the 
share price reaction to announced RIFs, and RIFs that are not announced are less likely to 
have substantial effects on share prices. 
We recorded 18 different reasons for the announced RIFs, and we were able to identify 
reasons for over 97 percent of the observations. For the purposes of our analysis, we collapsed 
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these 18 reasons into five categories (reorganization, plant closing, demand slump, cost issues, 
and other). We also know the number of workers planned to be let go as part of the RIF 
for 84.9 percent of the announcements. While the mean number of workers announced was 
2749 (standard deviation of 8410), the median number of workers let go was 700. 
We were able to determine whether workers involved were hourly, salaried, or some com-
bination for 25 percent of the RIFs, and, among these, 35 percent involved hourly workers, 
24 percent involved salaried workers, and 41 percent involved both. It is interesting that the 
composition of RIF announcements changed systematically over the 30 years studied toward 
inclusion of salaried workers. In the 1970s, 52 percent of announcements included salaried 
workers. This increased to 82 percent in the 1990s. The fraction including hourly workers 
fell from 82 percent in the 1970s to 68 percent in the 1990s.2 This change is consistent with 
the finding that job loss among more-skilled workers has become more common in the last 
twenty years (Farber, 2003). 
We recorded whether the job loss was temporary or permanent for 96.5 percent of the 
announcements, and, among these, 28 percent were temporary. Finally, we identified whether 
the RIF involved a foreign subsidiary for 91 percent of the announcements. Of these, only 
16.6 percent did involve a foreign subsidiary. 
In order to measure the stock price reaction, we used daily stock returns for each firm 
for each day in the sample. These data are collected by the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. Obviously, we needed to match our firm names 
as reported in Fortune with unique security identifiers used in CRSP. We identified 1,849 firm 
names that were in the Fortune 500 in any year from 1970-1999. After dropping firm names 
for which there was no information in CRSP (probably because they were not publicly 
traded), dropping firm names that were identified with multiple securities, and dropping 
names that were were identified with the same firm as another with either a similar (or in 
some cases quite different) name3, we were left with 1160 unique firms over the 30 years 
2
 The form of pay of workers is highly correlated with broad occupation, with salaried workers largely 
white collar and hourly workers largely blue collar. The sum of the shares including salaried and hourly 
workers exceeds one because a substantial fraction of announcements include both types of workers. 
3
 For example Freeport Sulfur is the same as Freeport Minerals, Hoover Universal is the same as Hoover 
Ball and Bearing, and Standard Oil of California is the same as Chevron. 
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Figure 1: Number of Layoff Announcements and Unemployment Rate, by Year 
from 1970-1999 for which we have valid stock data for at least some years. We were able 
to identify 4273 job loss announcements (made in 702 firms) that had matched stock return 
data for the relevant periods. 
Finally, we collected information on annual accounting and related data from Standard 
and Poor’s COMPUSTAT. The data we use include industry and number of employees. The 
median firm in the sample has roughly 49,000 employees. 
3 Frequency of Job Loss Announcements 
The number of RIFs announced by firms in our sample varies substantially across the years 
we study in ways that, not surprisingly, closely follow the state of the labor market. Figure 
1 displays the number of RIFs in our sample by year along with the civilian unemployment 
rate. The number of announcements varied from a minimum of 48 in 1997 (a year of very 
low unemployment) to a maximum of 320 in 1982 (a year of very high unemployment). 
Overall, the mean number of announcements per year was 150.6 with a standard deviation 
of 68.9. The simple correlation between the number of announcements and the civilian 
unemployment rate over the 1970-1999 period was 0.55. The time series of the number of 
RIF announcements per year follows the time series of the unemployment rate quite closely. 
Farber (2003) reports “three-year rates of job loss” using data from ten Displaced Worker’s 
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Surveys (DWS). He documents a decline in the overall rate of job loss from 12.8 percent in 
1981-83 to 8.5 percent in 1987-88, followed by an increase to an average of 11.8 percent in 
1989-91 and a decline to 8.6 percent in 1997-99. These findings are largely consistent with 
ours. 
4 The Event Study Method 
The event study method that we employ is widely used in the empirical corporate finance 
literature (Brown and Warner, 1985; Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll, 1969, and MacKinlay, 1997) and we will, therefore, only describe the 
very basic ideas here. We should note that clearly defining the event date is critical and is 
often very difficult. For example Card and Krueger (1995) study the effects of news about 
legislation concerning the minimum wage on firms that may employ minimum wage workers. 
They suggest that some events, such as when it was revealed that Labor Secretary Robert 
Reich unexpectedly suggested to President Clinton that the administration not push for 
an (expected) increase in the minimum wage are more useful (i.e., generally unanticipated) 
events than others such as when President George H. W. Bush (not unexpectedly) vetoed a 
minimum wage increase. 
In our case, we assume that the market became aware of the RIF on the day it was 
reported in the Wall Street Journal or at a time very close to that day. However, it may 
be that the market knew of what we identify as the announced event at some time prior, 
and, to the extent that this is the case, our analysis will not capture the full effect of layoff 
announcements on stock prices. 
Cumulative average excess returns are calculated, as described below, using value-weighted 
return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of 
Chicago. Let t index time in trading days, let s indicate the “event date” (the date of the 
RIF announcement), and let i index firms. First, the firm daily return, Rit, is regressed 
on Rmt, the value weighted market index for date t, which is available from CRSP. This 
regression, 
Rit = &i + PiRmt + f]iti (4.1) 
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is estimated for a period from day s — 60 to day s — 30.4 Next, for days around the event 
date, we calculate the daily abnormal, or excess, return, in the following way, 
ERn = Ra — (p iˆ + ˆ iRmt), (4.2) 
where di and ˆ i are the estimated regression coefficients from equation 4.1. Intuitively, the 
excess return is the part of the movement in the stock return of firm i that is not correlated 
with overall market movement in stock returns and presumably reflects unexpected firm-
specific factors. 
The excess returns calculated for each day around a RIF announcement are used to 
calculate the cumulative excess return for each announcement. These are computed by 
adding up the daily excess returns over various intervals called “event windows” around the 
date of the announcement. We report analyses based on cumulative excess returns computed 
using the three-day window.5 
5 Has the Market Reaction to RIF Announcements 
Changed Over Time? 
5.1 A review of the Literature 
Our analysis is the first investigation that covers a sufficiently long time period (30 years) 
to provide meaningful facts on changes over time in the reaction of stock prices to the an-
nouncements of RIFs. While a large number of previous studies have investigated the simple 
relationship between announcements of RIFs and share price reactions using various time 
periods, none of these studies uses data earlier than 1979 and they use sample periods rang-
ing from two to only nine years. The number of RIFs involved in each is also highly variable. 
In addition the focus of the previous papers was not always on a general set of announced 
4
 We tried various prediction periods such as -500 to -250 and -100 to -70 with no meaningful effect on 
the results. 
5
 While we do not present the results here, we also computed cumulative excess returns for a one day 
window (day s alone) and an eleven-day window (from day s — 5 to day s + 5). The results, as expected, are 
quite similar to those for the three day window reported here. 
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RIFs from a sample of firms from the United States. For example, Abowd, Milkovich, and 
Hannon (1990) examined the share price reaction to a wide variety of announcements of 
human resource management practices, including employee compensation increases, health 
and safety violations, and permanent staff reductions. Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990), 
and Kalra, Henderson, and Walker (1994) studied only plant closings. Gunderson, Verma, 
and Verma (1997) only examined Canadian Firms, Caves and Krepps (1993) were focused 
on manufacturing firms, and Hallock (1998) examined the relationship between Chief Exec-
utive Officer pay and announcements of worker reductions. Table 1 contains a brief review 
of some of these studies and reports point estimates of the average cumulative excess returns 
from the day prior to the day after the RIF announcement (the three-day event window).6 
These studies show a relatively stable and small estimate of the share price reaction to 
RIF announcements of between -0.05 and -1.29 percent, although two estimates, Caves and 
Krepps (-0.9 percent) and Datta and Iskandar-Datta (-1.3 percent) seem to be somewhat 
more negative than the others. The median estimate is -0.50 percent.7 
5.2 Changes Over T ime in Stock Market Response 
As a basis of comparison with the existing literature, table 1 also contains estimates based 
on our sample of the mean cumulative excess returns in a three-day event window for the 
entire 1970-99 time period as well as for three sub-periods. The overall mean for the 1970-99 
period using our sample is -0.315 percent (s.e. = 0.073), which is within the range of the 
existing estimates reported in the top panel of table 1. The estimates by subperiod provide 
preliminary evidence that the mean cumulative excess returns in response to announcements 
of RIFs have become less negative over time. The subperiod means were -0.594 percent (s.e. 
= 0.113) for the 1970-79 period, -0.240 percent (s.e. = 0.118) for the 1980-89 period, and 
-0.059 percent for the 1990-99 period (s.e. = 0.152).8 This pattern implies that the negative 
6
 In all but three studies from the previous literature we were able to identify the cumulative average 
excess return over the three day window. 
7
 Cascio, Young, and Morris (1997) investigate longer-term effects of layoffs on firms. 
8
 The differences between the mean for the 1970-79 period and the means for the other two periods are 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.04 for the comparison with 1980-89 and p-value 
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Table 1: Summary of Selected Previous Studies and Comparison with New Data 
3-day Window 
Author(s) 
Abowd, et. al. (1990) 
Abowd, et. al. (1990) 
Blackwell, et. al. (1990) 
Caves & Krepps (1993) 
Datta & Iskandar-Datta (1996) 
Golomba & Tsetkekos (1992) 
Gunderson, et. al (1997) 
Hallock (1998) 
Kalra, et. al. (1994) 
Ursel & Armstrong-Stassen (1995) 
Worell, et. al. (1991) 
Farber & Hallock 
Farber & Hallock 
Farber & Hallock 
Farber & Hallock 
Years 
1980 
1987 
1980-84 
1987-91 
1989-91 
1980-86 
1982-89 
1987-95 
1984-87 
1989-92 
1979-87 
1970-79 
1980-89 
1990-99 
1970-99 
N 
87 
38 
286 
513 
228 
282 
214 
1287 
132 
137 
194 
1529 
1533 
1211 
4273 
Type 
Perm. RIFs 
Perm. RIFs 
Plant closings 
Manuf. 
Broad set 
Plant closings 
Canadian firms 
Broad Set 
Plant Closings 
Broad Set 
Broad Set 
Broad set 
Broad set 
Broad set 
Broad set 
Cum Ex. Ret (%) 
-0.6 
-0.2 
-0.7 
-0.9 
-1.3(a) 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.3 
-0.5(a) 
-0.6(b) 
-0.4 
-0.594 
-0.240 
-0.059 
-0.315 
Note: (a) From day -1 to day 0 only. (b) day 0 only. 
effect of layoff announcements on share prices has moderated over the sample period. 
The upper left panel of figure 2 contains a plot of average cumulative excess returns by 
year using a 3-day event window for our sample of 4273 layoff announcements. Superimposed 
on this plot are the predicted values from an OLS regression of the annual values on a time 
trend.9 While the average shows substantial year-to-year variation, consistent with the 
summary by decade of our results in table 1, the trend is clearly upward. By the latter part 
of the period, the predicted values are positive. The upper right panel of figure 2 repeats 
this analysis for the median cumulative excess return. As expected, the median shows less 
year-to-year variation, and the trend is also clearly upward with positive predicted values by 
the late 1990s. The bottom panel of the figure carried out a similar analysis on the fraction 
of the cumulative excess returns in each year that are positive. This also shows an upward 
trend, with predicted probability of a positive share price reaction greater than one-half by 
= 0.003 for the comparison with 1990-99). The difference between the mean for the 1980-89 period and the 
1990-99 period is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.321). 
9
 This regression is weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the annual averages. 
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1970 
1970 
1980 1990 
Year 
Average C.E.R. 
1980 1990 
Year 
Frac Positive 
2000 
Predicted 
2000 
Predicted 
1970 1980 1990 
Year 
2000 
Median C.E.R. Predicted 
Figure 2: Measures of Central Tendency, C.E.R, by Year 
the late 1990s. 
I t is clear back in figure 1 that the number of announcements of RIFs follows the business 
cycle (as measured by the unemployment rate) quite closely. On this basis, i t might be 
expected that the market reaction to job loss announcements would be smaller in absolute 
magnitude in a weak labor market because laying off workers in a weak labor market would 
naturally carry less information about firm prospects. While there is substantial year-to-year 
variation in the average market reaction, no such cyclical pattern is obvious on examination 
of figure 2. As a crude indication of the lack of a cyclical pattern, the simple correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the annual average cumulative excess return for the 
three-day window is -0.04 (the wrong sign and insignificant, p-value = 0.84). 
The results in the lower panel of table 1 and in figure 2 suggest that the stock market 
response to layoff announcements has, in fact, become less negative by several measures of 
central tendency. Given the substantial variation in stock market response to individual 
announcements that is not captured by the measures of central tendency, it is useful to 
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examine in more detail how the distribution of stock market responses has changed. 
I t is possible that layoff announcements occur systematically around the time of other 
announcements that could affect stock prices. To the extent that this is the case, we could be 
mis-attributing systematic movements in stock prices to the layoff announcements when, in 
fact, they are due to the release of other information. In order to investigate this possibility, 
we calculated average cumulative excess returns for various subsets of our layoff announce-
ments that occurred in temporal isolation from other important announcements. First, we 
considered layoff announcements that were not within ten days in either direction of a div-
idend announcement for that firm. Second, we considered layoff announcements that were 
not within ten days in either direction of an earnings announcement for that firm. Finally, 
we considered layoff announcements where there was not another layoff announcement by 
that firm in the 100 previous days. 
The results of this analysis are contained in table 2. There is a strong pattern in the re-
sults suggesting that “clean” layoff announcements (announcements that are not temporally 
close to other announcements) have a stronger negative effect on average than do “dirty” 
layoff announcements (announcements that are close to other announcements). Considering 
the entire 1970-1999 period, the average 3-day cumulative excess returns for dirty layoff 
announcements are not significantly different from zero while the average 3-day cumulative 
excess returns are significantly different from zero for clean layoff announcements. However, 
both types of layoff announcements show an upward (less negative) trend across the decades. 
Figure 3 contains plots by year of the average, median, and percent positive 3-day cumulative 
excess returns for the clean and dirty announcements separately. While the stock market 
reaction is more negative for the clean than for the dirty announcements, both series show 
a similar increase over time. 
In order to illustrate how the distribution of stock market responses has changed more 
generally over time, the top panel of figure 4 contains kernel density estimates of the distri-
bution of cumulative excess returns for all layoff announcements by decade for the range -0.1 
to +0.l.10 There are some differences across decades in this part of the distribution. There 
10
 Fully 95.5 percent of the stock market reactions to layoff announcements are in the range from -0.1 
to +0.1, and the kernel density estimates of the distributions by decade are virtually identical outside this 
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Table 2: Average Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window 
(by time period and isloting events) 
All Announcements 
Selection Criterion: 
Near Dividend 
Announcement 
Not Near Divident 
Announcement 
Near Earnings 
Announcement 
Not Near Earnings 
Announcement 
Near Other RIF 
Announcements 
Not Near other RIF 
Announcements 
Near at Least One 
Announcement 
Not Near Any 
Announcement 
N 
4273 
2010 
2263 
1495 
2778 
1940 
2333 
2811 
1462 
1970-99 
-0.315 
(0.073) 
-0.014 
(0.106) 
-0.583 
(0.100) 
-0.018 
(0.123) 
-0.475 
(0.090) 
-0.178 
(0.108) 
-0.429 
(0.099) 
0.026 
(0.185) 
-0.230 
(0.263) 
1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 
-0.594 -0.240 -0.059 
(0.113) (0.118) (0.152) 
-0.327 0.048 0.324 
(0.162) (0.174) (0.223) 
-0.847 -0.489 -0.384 
(0.158) (0.161) (0.206) 
-0.396 0.057 0.194 
(0.217) (0.202) (0.224) 
-0.668 -0.394 -0.274 
(0.133) (0.146) (0.206) 
-0.467 0.053 -0.065 
(0.160) (0.170) (0.252) 
-0.721 -0.511 -0.055 
(0.160) (0.164) (0.190) 
-0.434 -0.057 0.026 
(0.139) (0.144) (0.185) 
-0.910 -0.612 -0.230 
(0.195) (0.206) (0.263) 
Note: Cumulative average excess returns are for the three days around the an-
nouncement of the job loss. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. “Not Near 
Dividend Announcement” implies no dividend announcements within 10 days before 
or after the layoff announcement. “Not Near Earnings Announcement” implies no 
earnings announcements within 10 days before or after the layoff announcement. 
“Not Near Other RIF Announcement” implies no other layoff announcements in the 
100 days prior to this layoff announcement. 
is more probability mass between -0.05 and 0 in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s. 
Correspondingly, there is more probability mass between 0 and +0.05 in the 1990s than in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, it appears that the movements in central tendency are a result of 
a reduction in the likelihood of small negative cumulative excess returns and an increase in 
the likelihood of small positive cumulative excess returns between the 1970s and the 1990s. 
The next two panels of figure 4 contain kernel density estimates of the distribution of 
cumulative excess returns for clean and dirty layoff announcements respectively. The dis-
range. 
P1a2ge 14 of 35 
The Changing Relationship Between CAHRS WP08-02 
1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
C l e a n 
2000 1970 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
D i r t y 
Ave rage C.E .R. A v e r a g e C.E .R. 
1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
C l e a n 
M e d i a n C .E .R. Pred ic ted 
2000 1970 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
D i r t y 
M e d i a n C .E .R. 
1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
C l e a n 
2000 1970 1 9 8 0 1 9 9 0 
Year 
D i r t y 
F rac Pos i t ive Pred ic ted F rac Pos i t i ve 
Figure 3: Measures of Central Tendency, C.E.R, by Year and Proximity 
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Figure 4: Distribution of C.E.R., by Decade. Kernel Density Estimates 
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tribution for the clean announcements shows a sharp shift of probability mass from below 
zero to above zero between the 1970s and 1990s. In contrast, the distribution for the dirty 
announcements shows a somewhat smaller shift from negative to positive values. Another 
contrast between the distributions is that the stock market response to clean announcements 
is more disperse than that for dirty announcements. In particular, there is more mass in the 
lower tail (a higher probability of large negative share price reactions) for clean announce-
ments. 
Overall, the pattern is clear. Our view is that the stock market reaction to clean an-
nouncements are more easily interpretable as due to the layoff announcements themselves. 
Interpretation of the dirty announcements is complicated by the possibility that at least some 
of the observed response is due to other contemporaneous news. However, the general time 
series patterns are similar in the two groups. The time-series of stock market reactions to 
announcements of both types show a sharp upward trend, starting from a negative average 
reaction in the 1970s and moving toward a roughly zero reaction on average in the 1990s. 
6 What Accounts for the Decline in the Negative Share 
Price Reaction? 
Given we have documented that the share price reaction to announcements of reductions in 
force is most negative early in our 30 year sample and has become less negative over time, 
we investigate some potential causes for this change. 
6.1 Change in Information Content of Announcements 
One purely mechanical explanation might be that improvements in information technology 
and communication have caused layoff announcements to carry less new information than 
they once did. This would account for a decrease in the absolute size of stock price reaction 
to the announcements over time. The kernel density estimates in figure 4 can be used to 
help rule out this explanation. I t is clear from the top panel of this figure that the variance 
of the stock price reaction has not declined. The distributions of stock price reactions in 
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each decade have approximately the same dispersion. The standard deviation of the 3-day 
cumulative excess returns in the 1970s was 0.044. The standard deviation increased over 
time to 0.046 in the 1980s and to 0.053 in the 1990s. Thus, there is no evidence that layoff 
announcements became less newsworthy over the sample period.11 
6.2 Change in Composition of Announcements 
Perhaps the most interesting possible explanation has to do with the stated reason for the 
layoff. Based on our reading of the articles in the Wall Street Journal announcing the 
layoffs, we were able to attribute reasons to all but 4.4 percent of the layoff announcements. 
In very broad terms, layoff announcements attribute layoffs to several major factors. The 
largest category is a “demand slump”, accounting for 42.5 percent of layoffs. We expect that 
such layoffs would signal difficulty in selling output and would be a negative signal to the 
market. Another 33.0 percent is accounted for by “cost issues” and “reorganization”. These 
might reflect efforts by management to streamline operations and reduce costs, and this 
might be a positive signal to the market. Plant closings account for another 7.6 percent of 
layoff announcements, and these could plausibly be interpreted as positive or negative news. 
The remaining 16.9 percent of announcements are for other stated reasons (12.5 percent) or 
missing reason (4.4 percent). 
The relative frequencies of these categories varied substantially over the period studied. 
Figure 5 contains histograms by decade of the distribution of layoff announcements by reason. 
Most striking is that the fraction of RIFs associated with a demand slump decreased sharply 
in the 1990s while the reorganization category increased substantially in both the 1980s and 
1990s. Announcements associated with cost issues also increased over the period.12 
The shift in the composition of RIF announcements away from the deficient-demand 
11
 Hallock and Mashayekhi (2006) investigate the share price reaction to a variety or corporate financial 
news announcements over time, including dividends announcements, stock splits, and earnings announce-
ments. They do not find a general trend toward a zero reaction as would be expected from the “news is less 
newsworthy” hypothesis. 
12
 An annual breakdown (not shown) shows that the demand-slump category has been quite variable and 
consistent with the business cycle. There are peaks associated with each of the recessions in the 1970s and 
1980s and a smaller peak associated with the recession of the early 1990s. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Layoff Announcements by Reason and Decade 
category and toward the efficiency categories has the potential to explain the decline in 
the magnitude of the negative average share price effect since 1970. A necessary condition 
for this explanation to be plausible is that it must be the case that average cumulative 
excess returns are more negative for deficient-demand RIFs than for efficiency RIFs. In 
order to investigate this directly, table 3 contains results of regression analyses of cumulative 
excess returns for the 3-day event window around layoff announcements. Given the similar 
time trends for clean (temporally isolated from other announcements) and dirty (temporally 
proximate to other announcements) announcements shown in figure 3, we pool both types 
of announcements in this analysis but allow for an intercept shift between the two types.13 
The estimates in the first column of table 3 contain the results for a model that includes 
only the dirty indicator and decade indicators. Starting from a significantly negative average 
13
 Exploration with separate models for clean and dirty announcements generally imply that the intercept 
shift is sufficient to capture the differences between the two types of announcements. 
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Table 3: Regresssion Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window 
Constant 
Dirty 
1980-89 
1990-99 
Reason Indicators: 
Reorganization 
Plant Closing 
Cost Issues 
Other 
Missing 
p-value Decade=0 
p-value Reason=0 
N 
R-Squared 
(1) 
1970-99 
-0.537 
(0.121) 
0.341 
(0.116) 
0.206 
(0.122) 
0.428 
(0.131) 
(2) 
1970-99 
-0.876 
(0.141) 
0.408 
(0.117) 
0.235 
(0.123) 
0.414 
(0.135) 
(3) 
1970-79 
-0.759 
(0.189) 
0.303 
(0.183) 
— 
— 
(4) 
1980-89 
-0.778 
(0.200) 
0.528 
(0.192) 
— 
— 
(5) 
1990-99 
-0.386 
(0.274) 
0.328 
(0.243) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0.005 
— 
4273 
0.004 
0.505 
(0.159) 
0.354 
(0.200) 
0.257 
(0.155) 
0.693 
(0.161) 
0.677 
(0.243) 
0.008 
0.000 
4273 
0.011 
0.407 
(0.293) 
0.705 
(0.292) 
0.011 
(0.258) 
0.619 
(0.214) 
0.453 
(0.313) 
— 
0.018 
1529 
0.011 
0.646 
(0.257) 
0.558 
(0.311) 
0.277 
(0.250) 
0.661 
(0.287) 
0.991 
(0.445) 
— 
0.024 
1533 
0.012 
0.431 
(0.298) 
-0.772 
(0.497) 
0.422 
(0.308) 
0.905 
(0.387) 
0.783 
(0.608) 
— 
0.030 
1211 
0.011 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the in-
verse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return. Dirty indicates that the job loss 
announcement was temporally proximate to a dividend, earnings or other layoff announce-
ment. The base category consists of layoff announcements in the 1970-79 period due to a 
“demand slump” that were clean. 
cumulative excess return (CER) for clean announcements in the 1970s, the average CER 
increased in the 1980s and even further in the 1990s. By the 1990s, the average CER is not 
significantly difference from zero. Dirty announcements have significantly higher average 
cumulative excess returns than clean announcements. 
The estimates in the second column of the table additionally include a set of indicator 
variables for the different stated reasons for the announced layoffs. The base category con-
sists of clean layoff announcements in the 1970s due to a slump in demand, and announced 
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layoffs in this category have an average CER of -0.876 percentage points. Dirty announce-
ments have significantly less negative average cumulative excess returns (as expected) than 
clean announcements by 0.41 percentage points. Consistent with our expectations, layoffs 
announced to be due to the growing category of reorganization have a significantly greater 
(by 0.51 percentage points) average CER. Layoff announcements in every category have a 
greater average CER than do those due to a slump in demand. Thus, it is possible that 
the change in average response over time can be accounted for by the the shift in announce-
ments away from those due to a demand slump toward categories with a less negative stock 
market response. However, the estimated coefficients on the decade dummy variables do not 
change in magnitude after the announced reason is controlled for. There remains a signif-
icant shift toward less negative stock market reaction to layoff announcements even within 
specific categories. 
The final three columns of table 3 contain separate analyses by decade. While the es-
timates are less precise due to the smaller sample sizes, the general pattern of results is 
identical to that in column 2. Layoff anouncements attributed to a demand slump have a 
more negative average stock price response than do layoff announcements attributed to any 
of the other reasons. An F-test of the hypothesis that the structure of the model is the same 
across the three decades apart from an intercept shift cannot be rejected at conventional 
levels (p-value = 0.331). In other words, the constrained model in column 2 of the table 
cannot be rejected against the unconstrained model in colums 3-5. 
6.2.1 Decomposition of Change in Average Cumulative Excess Returns 
In order to quantify how much of the decline in the negative share price effect can be 
accounted for by the shift in composition, we decompose the change in the average cumulative 
excess returns between the 1970-79 period and the 1990-99 period in two ways. First, we ask 
how much of the change over this period (0.53 percentage points, from -0.59 in the 1970-79 
period to -0.06 in the 1990-99 period) comes from each category. Algebraically, the overall 
change ( ) is 
= > [PjiRji — PJQRJO], (6.1) 
j 
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Table 4: Contribution of RIF Categories to Overall Changes in Share Price Reaction 
1970-79 1990-99 
Reason 
Reorganization 
Plant Closing 
Demand Slump 
Cost Issues 
Other 
Missing 
All 
Share 
0.09 
0.08 
0.47 
0.14 
0.16 
0.05 
1.00 
Ave. Return 
-0.11 
-0.04 
-0.86 
-0.87 
-0.28 
-0.11 
-0.59 
Share 
0.24 
0.08 
0.31 
0.22 
0.10 
0.04 
1.00 
Ave. Return 
0.20 
-1.50 
-0.41 
0.29 
0.45 
0.75 
-0.06 
Contribution 
0.06 
-0.12 
0.28 
0.19 
0.09 
0.04 
0.53 
Note: Average cumulative excess returns are computed using three-day event windows. 
The “contribution” column contains the contribution to the overall change of 0.53 in the 
average cumulative excess returns due to the particular announced reason for each RIF. This 
is computed as P j1R j1 - P j 0R j 0 for reason j , where period 0 refers to the 1970-1979 period, 
period 1 refers to the 1990-1999 period, P j t is the fraction of RIF announcements in period 
t that are of type j , and R j t is the average share price reaction for RIF announcements of 
type j in period t. 
where period 0 refers to the 1970-79 period, period 1 refers to the 1990-99 period, j indexes 
categories, P j t is the fraction of RIF announcements in period t that are of type j , and R j t 
is the average share price reaction for RIF announcements of type j in period t. The term 
in brackets is the contribution to the overall change from changes in share and stock price 
reactions in category j . 
Table 4 contains the components of this decomposition along with contribution of each 
category (in the last column). Fully 51 percent (0.27/0.53) of the overall change is due to 
changes in the “demand slump” category, and 36 percent (0.19/0.53) of the overall change 
is due to “cost issues”. Plant closings “go the other way,” accounting for a decline of 0.12 
percentage point in average CER. If we assume that reorganization and cost represent the 
efficiency categories and that plant closing and demand slump represent the deficient demand 
categories, it is the case that changes in the efficiency category accounts for 47.2 (0.25/0.53) 
percent of the overall change and changes in the deficient demand categories account for 28 
percent (0.15/0.53) percent of the overall change. 
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The second type of decomposition breaks the overall change into components due to 
1) a change in the mix of categories and 2) changes in the average excess returns within 
categories. We compute two versions of the decomposition of in equation 6.1. The first is 
= > [RJQ(PJI — PJO)] + / [Pji(Rji ~ Rjo)]- (6.2) 
j 3 
The first term of this decomposition is the contribution of the change in composition of the 
RIF announcements weighted by the average excess returns in the initial period (1970-79). 
The second term of the decomposition is the contribution of the change in returns within 
each category weighted by the proportion of RIFs of reason j in the second period (1990-99). 
The second version of this decomposition is 
= > [Rj\(Pj\ — PJO)] + / [Pjo(Rji ~ Pjo)]- (6.3) 
3 3 
This is identical to the first decomposition except that 1) the contribution of the change 
in composition of the RIF announcements is weighted by the average excess returns in the 
second period (1990-99) rather than in the initial period and 2) the contribution of the 
change in returns within each category is weighted by the proportion of RIFs of reason j in 
the initial period (1970-79) rather than in the second period. 
Table 5 contains estimates of these two decompositions using the average returns and 
fraction of RIFs in each category shown in figure 5. Both decompositions show similar 
results. Changes in the distribution of RIFs by reason account for only a small fraction of 
the change in the share price reaction between the 1970s and the 1990s. The share accounted 
for by changes in the distribution of RIFs accounts for about 15 percent percent (0.08/0.53) 
percent of the change in the share price reaction. The majority of the overall share price 
reaction (85 percent = 0.45/0.53) is accounted for by changes in the average share price 
reaction within categories. 
This analysis does not provide much support for the view that the decline in the negative 
share price effect of announcements of RIFs is due to a shift away from deficient demand 
RIFs and toward efficiency RIFs. 
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Table 5: Decomposition of Overall Change in Share Price Reaction: 1970-79 to 1990-99. 
Reason 
Reorganization 
Plant Closing 
Demand Slump 
Cost Issues 
Other 
Missing 
All 
(1) 
0.06 
-0.12 
0.28 
0.19 
0.09 
0.04 
0.53 
(2) (3) 
RJO(PJI — PJO) Pj\(Rji — RJO) 
-0.02 0.07 
0.00 -0.12 
0.14 0.14 
-0.07 0.26 
0.02 0.07 
0.00 0.03 
0.07 0.46 
(4) (5) 
Rji(Pji — PJO) Pjo(Rj\ — RJO) 
0.03 0.03 
0.00 -0.12 
0.07 0.21 
0.02 0.16 
-0.03 0.12 
-0.01 0.04 
0.08 0.44 
Note: Average cumulative excess returns are computed using three-day event win-
dows. Column 1 contains the contribution to the change in average cumulative excess 
returns from RIF announcements by reason. Columns 2 and 3 contain the first de-
composition of this change, defined in equation 6.2. Columns 4 and 5 contain the 
second decomposition of this change, defined in equation 6.3. The shares and returns 
required to compute these decompositions are contained in table 4. Period 0 refers 
to the 1970-79 period, period 1 refers to the 1990-99 period, j indexes the announced 
reasons, P j t is the fraction of RIF announcements in period t that are of type j , and 
R j t is the is average share price reaction for RIF announcements of type j in period 
t. 
6.3 Other Characteristics of Announced RIFs 
I t may be that shifts in other characteristics of announced layoffs could account for the 
increase in stock price reaction since the 1970s. We collected information from Wall Street 
Journal articles announcing the layoffs on several characteristics in addition to the stated 
reason, including the type of workers involved (salaried, hourly, or both), the duration of 
the announced layoff (temporary or permanent), and the number of workers involved in 
the announced layoff. We created an indicator for large announced layoffs by calculating 
the share of total firm employment of each layoff announcement and coding the announced 
layoff as large if the share exceeded the median in our sample (0.016).14 
Table 6 contains WLS regressions of cumulative excess returns that include measures of 
14
 We used total firm employment data from COMPUSTAT in computing the layoff share. 
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Table 6: Regresssion Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window 
Constant 
1980-89 
1990-99 
Type of Worker 
Salaried 
Salaried and Hourly 
Missing Type 
Duration of Layoff 
Permanent 
Missing Duration 
Size of Layoff 
Greater than Median 
Share 
Missing Size 
Other Controls 
Reason (6 categories) 
Dirty (2 categories) 
p-value Decade=0 
p-value Reason=0 
p-value Type=0 
p-value Duration=0 
p-value Size=0 
N 
R-Squared 
(1) 
1970-99 
-0.876 
(0.141) 
0.235 
(0.123) 
0.414 
(0.135) 
(2) 
1970-99 
-0.657 
(0.221) 
0.264 
(0.125) 
0.497 
(0.142) 
(3) 
1970-79 
-0.540 
(0.309) 
— 
— 
(4) 
1980-89 
-0.470 
(0.362) 
— 
— 
(5) 
1990-99 
-0.069 
(0.531) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
0.088 
(0.266) 
0.215 
(0.229) 
-0.148 
(0.173) 
-0.160 
(0.494) 
-0.024 
(0.359) 
-0.135 
(0.242) 
0.349 
(0.441) 
-0.223 
(0.364) 
-0.137 
(0.280) 
0.223 
(0.541) 
1.058 
(0.526) 
-0.005 
(0.442) 
— 
— 
-0.230 
(0.134) 
0.228 
(0.293) 
-0.018 
(0.186) 
0.572 
(0.340) 
-0.315 
(0.221) 
-0.396 
(0.553) 
-0.734 
(0.360) 
0.230 
(1.261) 
— 
— 
-0.203 
(0.137) 
0.108 
(0.126) 
-0.664 
(0.217) 
0.055 
(0.184) 
-0.008 
(0.229) 
0.104 
(0.207) 
-0.033 
(0.285) 
0.217 
(0.297) 
Yes 
Yes 
0.008 
— 
— 
— 
— 
4273 
0.011 
Yes 
Yes 
0.002 
0.000 
0.151 
0.091 
0.076 
4273 
0.014 
Yes 
Yes 
— 
0.015 
0.936 
0.186 
0.003 
1529 
0.021 
Yes 
Yes 
— 
0.030 
0.547 
0.346 
0.848 
1533 
0.015 
Yes 
Yes 
— 
0.011 
0.027 
0.103 
0.616 
1211 
0.023 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the in-
verse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return. The base category consists of 
clean permanent layoff announcements smaller than median share of employment for hourly 
workers in the 1970-79 period due to a “demand slump”. 
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these layoff characteristics in addition to the reason indicators, decade indicators and the 
clean/dirty indicator used in table 3. The first column of the table contains only the controls 
for decade, clean/dirty, and reason. This reproduces the estimates in column 2 of table 3 
for ease of comparison. The estimates in column 2 of table 6 include the additional controls, 
and we also present p-values of F-tests of the hypothesis that the controls in each dimension 
have zero coefficients. Controlling for decade, clean/dirty, and reason explain statistically 
significant shares of the variation in cumulative excess returns. We do not present the 
coefficient estimates for reason and clean/dirty indicators, but they are qualitatively similar 
to those in column 2 of table 3. However, the coefficients in the other dimensions are of 
marginal statistical significance. 
There is weak evidence that announcements of permanent layoffs result in a more neg-
ative average stock price reaction than do announcements of temporary layoffs. There is 
also weak evidence that announcements of large (greater than median share) layoffs have a 
more negative share price reaction than do announcements of relatively small layoffs. These 
findings are consistent with the notion that both permanent layoffs and large layoffs are 
likely to carry more information about firms’ longer run prospects than their complements. 
The coefficients on the decade indicators do not change substantially when controlling 
for the additional announcement characteristics. The pattern of increasing (less negative) 
stock price reactions to layoff announcements over time remains. 
The last three columns of table 6 contain separate regression analyses by decade. Once 
again, the null hypothesis that the constrained version of the model, estimated in column 2, 
that allows for separate intercepts by decade but constrains other coefficients to be constant 
over time cannot be rejected (marginally) at conventional levels (p-value = 0.106). However, 
there are some interesting contrasts in effects over time. In the 1970s, large layoffs are asso-
ciated with a significantly larger negative average stock price reaction than are small layoffs. 
No such relationship exists in the 1980s or 1990s. Permanent layoffs are not significantly 
related to average stock price reaction in the 1970s or 1980s, but they are associated with 
a significantly larger negative average share price reaction in the 1990s than are temporary 
layoffs. 
Overall, none of the measured characteristics of layoffs announcements has any sub-
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Table 7: Layoff Announcements by Industry and Decade and Decade 
Frequency Distribution 
(row percentages) 
Decade 
1970-79 
1980-89 
1990-99 
Non 
Manuf 
11.45 
18.39 
35.60 
Non MV 
Manuf 
51.21 
51.98 
42.68 
MV 
Manuf 
37.34 
29.64 
21.73 
1970-99 20.96 49.02 30.03 
Note: Announcements with missing industry are not included in the calcula-
tions. The total number of announcements is 3560. 
stantial effect on the trend toward smaller average cumulative excess returns around the 
announcements of layoffs. 
6.4 Variation by Industry 
The industrial composition of layoff announcements has changed dramatically over the last 
three decades. Table 7 contains the frequency distribution by decade of layoff announcements 
for three industry groups. Over the period as a whole, fully 30 percent of layoff announce-
ments were by firms whose primary industry was motor vehicle equipment manufacturing 
(SIC 37) and an additional 49 percent was by firms in other manufacturing industries. Firms 
outside of manufacturing accounted for 21 percent of layoff announcements. The distribu-
tion has shifted away from manufacturing since the 1970s. The total manufacturing share of 
layoff announcements declined from 88.6 percent in the 1970s to 64.4 percent in the 1990s. 
The decline in motor vehicle manufacturings shares was even sharper, from 37.3 percent to 
21.7 percent. 
This shift in the locus of layoff announcements raises the possibility that part of the 
increased share price reaction could be accounted for by the move away from manufactur-
ing in general and motor vehicle manufacturing in particular. In order to investigate this 
possibility, table 8 contains average cumulative excess returns calculated separately for each 
decade and three industry groups.15 The average for all industries shows the movement from 
15 The overall averages do not match those shown in table 2 because announcements with missing industry 
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Table 8: Layoff Announcements by Industry and Decade and Decade 
Average Cumulative Excess Returns 
Decade 
1970-79 
1980-89 
1990-99 
1970-99 
All 
-0.315 
(0.093) 
-0.094 
(0.095) 
0.072 
(0.109) 
-0.132 
(0.057) 
Non 
Manuf 
0.147 
(0.258) 
0.138 
(0.190) 
0.152 
(0.165) 
0.146 
(0.112) 
Non MV 
Manuf 
-0.497 
(0.154) 
-0.379 
(0.150) 
-0.032 
(0.189) 
-0.337 
(0.089) 
MV 
Manuf 
-0.287 
(0.122) 
0.130 
(0.156) 
0.090 
(0.225) 
-0.095 
(0.098) 
p-value 
all equal 
0.069 
0.027 
0.777 
0.003 
Note: Standard errors of means are reported in parentheses. Observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return. An-
nouncements with missing industry are not included in the “A l l ” column. The total 
number of announcements is 3560. 
a signficantly negative average CER in the 1970s to a positive and insignificant value by 
1990-99. 
I t is clear that the average CER for the three industry groups are quite different from 
one another (p-value of equality across industries = 0.003). There is a clear pattern when 
considering the entire 1970-99 period. There is a significant negative average share price 
reaction to layoff announcements by manufacturing firms outside of motor vehicles. There 
is not a significant average share price reaction to layoff announcements by firms outside 
manufacturing or in motor vehicle manufacturing. 
The time series patterns by industry group are interesting. The estimated average share 
price reaction to layoff announcements by firms outside of manufacturing is positive but 
insignificantly different from zero in each decade, and the differences across decades are not 
statistically signicant (p-value = 0.999). In manufacturing outside of motor vehicles, the 
share price reaction becomes less negative over time with a change between the 1970s and 
1990s of 0.465 (p-value = 0.0567). In motor vehicle manufacturing there is a significant move 
toward a positive average share price reaction between the 1970s and 1980s (from -0.287 to 
+0.130, p-value = 0.036). 
are not included. 
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The general pattern is clear. There is no significant share price reaction to layoff an-
nouncements outside of manufacturing in any decade. Within manufacturing, there is a 
significant negative share price reaction early in the period that disappears by the 1990s. 
The negative share price reaction in manufacturing is larger in absolute value outside of 
motor vehicles than in the motor vehicle sector. 
In order to investigate whether the shift in layoff announcements away from manufac-
turing can account for the movement away from a negative share price reaction, we next 
carry out a multivariate analysis of the share price reaction that accounts for the set of 
announcement characteristics used in table 6. This analysis is contained in table 9. The 
estimates in the first column of the table replicate those in the first column of table 3 and 
show the raw average share price reaction by decade controlling only for temporal proximity 
to other announcements. The second column of the table contains estimates for a model that 
additionally includes controls for industry group. These estimates confirm that, relative to 
firms outside of manufacturing, manufacturing firms (at least those outside of motor vehi-
cle manufacturing) have a significantly more negative share price reaction. The time series 
changes measured by the decade variables are only slightly attenuated from their values in 
the model that does not control for industry. Thus, the shift in the industry composition of 
firms announcing layoffs does not account for much of the change over time in the average 
share price reaction. The estimates in column 3 of the table are from a model that addi-
tionally controls for the broader set of announcement characteristics used in table 6. The 
changes over time are a bit larger in this specification, but the general pattern of results is 
unchanged. 
The last three columns of table 9 contains estimates from separate models for each of 
the three industry groups. There is clearly no significant change over time in average share 
price reaction to layoff announcements by firms outside of manufacturing. Similarly, while 
the point estimates suggest that average share price reaction to layoff announcements by 
firms in manufacturing other than motor vehicles increased over time, the hypothesis that 
there has been no change across decades cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.286). I t is only for 
layoff announcements by firms in motor vehicle manufacturing that the average share price 
reaction has become significantly less negative over time (p-value = 0.017), with the change 
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Table 9: Regresssion Analysis of Cumulative Excess Returns, 3-day Window 
Constant 
1980-89 
1990-99 
Industry 
Non-MV Manufacturing 
Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
Missing Industry 
Other Controls 
Dirty (2 categories) 
Reason (6 categories) 
Type (3 categories) 
Duration (3 categories) 
Size (3 categories) 
p-value Decade=0 
p-value Industry =0 
N 
R-Squared 
(1) 
All 
-0.537 
(0.121) 
0.206 
(0.122) 
0.428 
(0.131) 
(2) 
All 
-0.325 
(0.172) 
0.196 
(0.124) 
0.374 
(0.136) 
(3) 
All 
-0.420 
(0.262) 
0.251 
(0.126) 
0.440 
(0.145) 
— 
— 
— 
-0.361 
(0.148) 
-0.178 
(0.157) 
-0.001 
(0.173) 
-0.326 
(0.150) 
-0.210 
(0.166) 
-0.080 
(0.202) 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
0.005 
— 
4273 
0.004 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
0.022 
0.040 
4273 
0.005 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.009 
0.169 
4273 
0.015 
(4) 
Non 
Manuf 
0.224 
(0.580) 
0.020 
(0.334) 
-0.121 
(0.342) 
(5) 
Non MV 
Manuf 
-0.756 
(0.495) 
0.231 
(0.221) 
0.419 
(0.271) 
(6) 
MV 
Manuf 
-0.463 
(0.431) 
0.513 
(0.204) 
0.559 
(0.268) 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.867 
— 
746 
0.013 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.286 
— 
1745 
0.028 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
0.017 
— 
1069 
0.028 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the in-
verse of the standard error of the cumulative excess return. “Dirty” indicates that the 
job loss announcement was temporally proximate to a dividend, earnings or other layoff 
announcement. The base category consists of clean permanent non-manufacturing layoff 
announcments smaller than median share of employment for hourly workers in the 1970-79 
period due to a “demand slump”. 
occurring between the 1970s and 1980s. 
The 1970s were a period of sharp negative demand shocks for the motor vehicle industries 
in the wake of rapidly increasing fuel prices due to the OPEC oil embargoes while the 1980s 
were a period of retrenchment and reorganization for the industry. We would expect a more 
negative response to the 1970s shocks relative to the 1980s reorganization. The fact that the 
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stated reason variables do not appear to account for the change between these two decades 
may reflect difficulty in measuring the true reasons for the layoffs. 
Overall, the analysis by industry shows a substantial shift away from layoffs in manu-
facturing, particularly motor vehicle manufacturing, and toward non-manufacturing. The 
average share price reaction to layoff announcements outside of manufacturing was around 
zero throughout the period and the locus of negative share price reactions is in the man-
ufacturing sector. However, share price reactions became less negative on average within 
manufacturing so that the shift in announcements away from manufacturing cannot account 
for the overall decline in share price reaction. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
We use a very large sample of layoff announcements by large firms over a 30-year period to 
investigate whether there has been a change in the relationship between share prices and 
announced RIFs over time. We have several findings including: 
• The number of announced RIFs seem to follow the business cycle quite closely. 
• The overall stock price reaction, as measured by any of several measures of the dis-
tribution of cumulative excess returns, is most negative earlier in the sample and has 
become less so over time. 
• The variance across announcements in the stock price reaction has not declined over 
time, suggesting that there has not been a general reduction in the information content 
of layoff announcements. 
• Layoff announcements that are temporally proximate to other public announcements, 
including dividend announcements, earnings announcements, and other layoff announce-
ments, have a smaller absolute effect on stock price than do temporally isolated layoff 
announcements. 
• While there has been a shift away from layoffs due to a slump in demand and toward 
layoffs due to restructuring and cost considerations, this shift cannot account for the 
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change over time in the stock price reaction. 
• Changes in the industrial composition of layoff announcements away from firms in 
manufacturing industries cannot account for the change over time in the stock price 
reaction. 
• Other characteristics of announced layoffs, including proposed duration, salaried vs. 
hourly workers, and the size of the layoff are not strongly related to the stock price 
reaction. 
One limitation of our analysis is that it is based on layoff announcements by firms in the 
Fortune 500 at some point over the past three decades. While our findings likely generalize 
to the population of large firms, i t may not be the case that the share price reactions of 
smaller firms would follow the same pattern. 
We believe that we have showed convincingly that the stock market reaction to layoff 
announcements has become less negative over time. However, despite our best efforts, we 
have not been able to isolate the reasons for this change.16 
16
 Perhaps other research methods such as interviews may prove fruitful. For example, Hallock (2006) 
interviewed 40 senior mangers in variety of firms in order to investigate such issues as whether published 
reasons for firm actions are credible and why firms make layoffs at certain times of the year or week. 
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